‏إظهار الرسائل ذات التسميات the Arab world. إظهار كافة الرسائل
‏إظهار الرسائل ذات التسميات the Arab world. إظهار كافة الرسائل

2025-03-28

La Política Y Los Dilemas Del Capital Del Conocimiento En El Mundo Árabe

 


Dr. Salam Al Rabadi

     Todos los países del mundo árabe se enfrentan a dilemas cognitivos complejos en el nivel de formación de capital de conocimientos. A pesar de los notables avances logrados en términos de indicadores de difusión de conocimientos en las sociedades árabes, no se deben ignorar muchos hechos que requieren una lectura cuidadosa y reflexiva de sus implicaciones.

     Según el Informe Económico Árabe (publicado por el Fondo Monetario Árabe en 2022), la tasa de analfabetismo en el mundo árabe es de alrededor del 25%, lo que se considera la más alta del mundo (con la excepción de África subsahariana, que ronda el 34%), ya que hay aproximadamente 70 millones de árabes analfabetos y hay aproximadamente 15 millones de niños fuera de cualquier sistema educativo.

     Si queremos definir con mayor precisión la realidad del capital intelectual árabe y no conformarnos sólo con indicadores cuantitativos, debemos llamar aquí la atención sobre los dilemas asociados a cada uno de los siguientes aspectos:

•       La abundancia de especializaciones versus la escasez de otras especializaciones (especialmente las científicas).

•       La viabilidad real del fenómeno de la difusión de la existencia de universidades como sucursales de instituciones educativas extranjeras.

          En consecuencia, podemos plantear los problematics relacionados con las estrategias educativas capaces de seguir el ritmo de las exigencias de la economía y la sociedad del conocimiento, de acuerdo con el siguiente dilema:

¿Son las políticas y la metodología educativas en el mundo árabe capaces de crear una masa crítica de capital de conocimiento que pueda satisfacer las necesidades intelectuales y culturales de la sociedad o las necesidades económicas de los mercados laborales?

     A pesar de todos los esfuerzos realizados para avanzar en este camino, y en lugar de limitarse a mejorar los indicadores cuantitativos, parece que aún estamos lejos de alcanzar los estándares globales para formar una masa crítica de capital de conocimiento cualitativo. Actualmente existen profundas dudas sobre la capacidad de crear espacios dinámicos, innovadores y críticos a través de los cuales podamos formar esa masa crítica para enfrentar los dilemas económicos y sociales acumulados, incluidas las insolubles crisis políticas e intelectuales en el mundo árabe.

     Por lo tanto, en principio, hay que reconocer que no es posible formar un capital de conocimiento sólido y sólido sin una visión clara de la identidad del ciudadano árabe cuyo conocimiento se pretende formar. Aquí surge la importancia del papel decisivo de los líderes políticos y las élites intelectuales, que pueden desempeñar en la reestructuración de todos los conceptos, estrategias y prácticas relacionadas con el proceso de producción y formación de la masa crítica de capital de conocimiento.

     En este contexto, para demostrar la fragilidad de las estrategias árabes de conocimiento y la falta de visión a nivel político en relación con el desempeño del conocimiento, sólo tenemos que plantear los siguientes dilemas:

-  El reducido gasto público árabe en investigación científica, que se ha convertido en una parte esencial del poder blando de los países: según informes de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Educación, la Ciencia y la Cultura (UNESCO), el gasto total en investigación científica en el mundo árabe no supera el 0,59% del producto interior bruto, frente a la media mundial de aproximadamente el 2,3%.

-  La escasez de apoyo a la producción o la lectura de libros: el mundo árabe produce menos del 1% de la producción mundial de libros (aunque el porcentaje de la población árabe es de aproximadamente el 5,5% de la población mundial).

-  La mala calidad de los libros publicados y la limitada base de lectores reales en lengua árabe: por desgracia, el ciudadano árabe sólo lee una media de 6 minutos al año, frente a las 200 horas anuales del ciudadano europeo.

-  El mundo árabe tiene las tasas más altas de fuga de cerebros y migración de habilidades del mundo: como resultado de un entorno político e intelectual incapaz de retener o atraer talento e innovadores, la mayoría de los estudiantes árabes que estudian en el extranjero no regresan a sus países de origen (especialmente aquellos con doctorados).

          En conclusión, estos dilemas confirman inevitablemente la urgente necesidad de aumentar la inversión en capital de conocimiento relacionado con la investigación científica. Aquí también debemos darnos cuenta del peligro de convencernos de la viabilidad de políticas públicas relacionadas con la importación de conocimiento y tecnología con dinero, sin la existencia de un entorno político favorable basado fundamentalmente en:

- Localizar el pensamiento racional y crítico.

- Factores que generen creatividad e innovación.

     En consecuencia, las visiones políticas seguirán siendo fundamentalmente capaces de crear un entorno propicio para la formación y consolidación de una masa crítica cualitativa de capital de conocimiento real, que en principio debe basarse en:

1.     La filosofía de la ciencia y el contrato social que sustente el Estado de derecho y el respeto a la diversidad.

2.     La modernización política, cultural y económica.

     A la luz de lo anterior, y lejos de la afición de los vencidos a imitar al vencedor, es necesario destacar que no podemos lograr ningún avance cualitativo a nivel de cómo formar esa masa crítica sin una estrategia política seria que nos permita involucrarnos e invertir en ese sistema de capital de conocimiento que sea capaz de absorber nuestro presente y futuro con una comprensión racional y crítica, y a través del cual podamos superar la dependencia cognitiva, ya sea tecnológica, económica, política, cultural o incluso recreativa y deportiva.

 


2025-02-09

Politics and the Dilemmas of Knowledge Capital in the Arab World



Dr. Salam Al Rabadi \ The Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC).

https://russiancouncil.ru/en/blogs/salam_alrabadi-en/politics-and-the-dilemmas-of-knowledge-capital-in-the-arab-world/   

     All countries in Arab world face complex cognitive dilemmas at the level of knowledge capital formation. Despite the remarkable progress achieved in terms of knowledge dissemination indicators in Arab societies, many facts should not be ignored that require a careful and thoughtful reading of their implications.  

     According to the Arab Economic Report (issued by the Arab Monetary Fund 2022), the illiteracy rate in the Arab world is about 25%, which is considered the highest in the world (with the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa at about 34%), as there are approximately 70 million illiterate Arabs, and there are approximately 15 million children outside any educational systems.

     If we want to frame the reality of Arab intellectual capital more accurately and not be satisfied with quantitative indicators only, here we must draw attention to the dilemmas associated with each of:

-      The abundance of specializations versus the scarcity of other specializations (especially scientific ones).

-      The actual feasibility of the phenomenon of the spread of the existence of universities as branches of foreign educational institutions.

          Accordingly, we can raise the problems related to educational strategies capable of keeping pace with the requirements of the knowledge economy and society, according to the following dilemma:  

Are educational policies and methodology in the Arab world able to create a critical mass of knowledge capital that can meet the intellectual and cultural needs of society or the economic needs of labor markets?

     Despite all the efforts made to advance on this path, and instead of merely improving quantitative indicators, it seems that we are still far from meeting the global standards for forming a critical mass of qualitative knowledge capital. There are currently deep doubts about the ability to create dynamic, innovative and critical spaces through which we can form that critical mass in order to confront the accumulated economic and social dilemmas, including the intractable political and intellectual crises in the Arab world.

      Therefore, in principle, it must be acknowledged that it is not possible to form a solid and solid knowledge capital without a clear vision of the identity of the Arab citizen whose knowledge is to be formed. Here, the importance of the decisive role of political leaders and intellectual elites emerges, which they can play in restructuring all concepts, strategies and practices related to the process of producing and forming the critical mass of knowledge capital.

     In this context, to demonstrate the fragility of Arab knowledge strategies and the lack of vision at the political level related to knowledge performance, we only have to pose the following dilemmas:

-      The small size of Arab government spending on scientific research, which has become an essential part of the soft power of countries: According to reports by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), total spending on scientific research in the Arab world does not exceed 0.59% of the gross domestic product, compared to the global average of approximately 2.3%.

-      The scarcity of support for book production or reading: The Arab world produces less than 1% of the world’s book production (although the percentage of the Arab population is approximately 5.5% of the world’s population).

-      The poor quality of published books and the limited base of actual readers in the Arabic language: Unfortunately, the Arab citizen only reads an average of 6 minutes per year, compared to 200 hours per year for the European individual.

-      The Arab world has the highest rates of brain drain and skills migration in the world: as a result of a political and intellectual environment that is unable to retain or attract talent and innovators, most Arab students who study abroad do not return to their home countries (especially those with doctorates).

     In conclusion, these dilemmas and problematics inevitably confirm the urgent need to increase investment in knowledge capital related to scientific research. Here we must also realize the danger of being convinced of the feasibility of public policies related to importing knowledge and technology with money, without the existence of an enabling political environment based primarily on:

1.            Localizing rational and critical thinking.

2.            Factors that create creativity and innovation.

     Accordingly, political visions will remain primarily capable of creating a supportive environment for the formation and consolidation of a qualitative critical mass of real knowledge capital, which in principle must be based on:

-    The philosophy of science and the social contract that supports the rule of law and respect for diversity.

-              Political, cultural and economic modernization.

     In light of the above, and far from the vanquished's fondness for imitating the victor, it is necessary to emphasize that we cannot achieve any qualitative breakthrough at the level of how to form that critical mass without a serious political strategy that enables us to engage and invest in this system of knowledge capital that is capable of absorbing our present and future with a rational and critical understanding, through which we can overcome cognitive dependence, whether technological, economic, political, cultural, or even recreational and sporting.








2024-06-08

Israel Y La Guerra Global Contra Siria: Cambios Geopoliticos


Por Dr. Salam Al Rabadi

 Centro de Estudios Internacionales para el Desarrollo(CEID),la Sociedad Argentina de Estudios Estratégicos y Globales (SAEGG), Argentina.. 

ISSN 2422-667X


Los resultados de la guerra global contra Siria constituyeron una amenaza real para Israel, contrariamente a lo que había planeado. Con la victoria de Siria y sus aliados en esa guerra, se produjeron cambios geopolíticos que amenazaron el equilibrio de poder que anteriormente había tendido a favor de Israel. El objetivo de esa guerra global era y sigue siendo paralizar la capacidad de Siria y sacarla del círculo de conflicto regional y global sobre el eje de resistencia y su papel futuro en la confrontación con Israel.

    

     A Israel le interesa desmantelar a Siria. La continuación de esta guerra significa que Siria ya no representa ninguna amenaza estratégica para Israel, especialmente en términos de la incapacidad de las instituciones militares para desarrollar sus capacidades integrales y el impulso hacia un mayor vacío político y el debilitamiento del Estado sirio. En consecuencia, esto conduce a un aumento de las posibilidades de que Siria haga concesiones fundamentales y estratégicas al nivel del conflicto árabe-israelí  .

      

     Sin embargo, parece que esta guerra tuvo resultados y repercusiones adversas y algo peligrosas en la seguridad nacional israelí, al contrario de lo que se esperaba. Siria y el eje de la resistencia pudieron salir de esa guerra algo victoriosos a nivel estratégico al preservar el actual sistema de gobierno e impedir la división de Siria, además de adquirir una feroz experiencia de combate como resultado de la lucha contra los movimientos terroristas, también abrió un camino Nuevo frente de batalla en el sur de Siria contra Israel, donde el ejército iraní tiene ahora presencia directa en la frontera con Israe.

      

     Por lo tanto, con base en las repercusiones y resultados de esta guerra global contra Siria, hay preguntas o problemáticas fundamentales que deben plantearse, y son las siguientes:

 

· ¿Cómo podemos abordar los cambios geopolíticos resultantes de la victoria del eje de la resistencia en la guerra global contra Siria?

· ¿Cuáles son las implicaciones de los logros militares alcanzados por Irán, Siria y Hezbollah en sus guerras contra los movimientos terroristas en futuros enfrentamientos integrales y directos con Israel?

· ¿Son las instituciones políticas y de seguridad israelíes capaces de afrontar los desafíos cruciales que se avecinan?

2024-06-04

Israeli Intervention in the Syrian War: Opportunities and Challenges

 


By Dr. Salam Al Rabadi

The Galician Institute of International Analysis and Documentation (IGADI),Spain.

      Perhaps it does not require much effort to demonstrate the extent of Israel's involvement and active participation in the global war launched against Syria since 2011, which represented a real opportunity to settle scores with the resistance axis, which has become a real deterrent to their influence[1]. Consequently, Israel has been an important partner in the war from the beginning, starting with plans to rely on the Muslim Brotherhood movement, in addition to the understanding with some Gulf states and Turkey to bet on the ISIS movement and the Al Nusra Front, or a direct and explicit intervention by launching air or missile attacks on Syrian territory. The most important of these was the Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus in April 2024. 

        This way of thinking, which considers the use of force in all its forms as the only way to maintain Israeli superiority in the region, reflects the mental security structure of the vision that the Jewish State has of itself and its neighborhood. As a result, Israel launched numerous airstrikes against the positions of the Syrian army and Hezbollah, with the aim of strengthening and supporting the terrorist movement's fighters to ensure their control over the largest area of ​​Syrian territory. Despite Israel attempt to give the impression that there is no connection with all the events of the war in Syria, Israel public contributions on the ground were enough to confirm the depth of involvement in the war. With the development of events and the defeat of the terrorist movements, Israel intervened directly in the war, in order to achieve the following objectives:

      1. Refusal to recognize the victory of the resistance axis in the war.

2. Support terrorist movements and make them feel that Israel does not abandon its allies.

3. Prevent the advance of the Syrian Arab Army on the southern front bordering its borders.

4. Prevent the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

5. Prevent the establishment of camps for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in Syria.

6. Ensure that there is no direct friction between the resistance axis and the Israeli army in the Golan region.

      In fact, there is a lot of evidence that confirms the clear Israeli intervention in the war as its training and logistical contribution was developed into direct participation, including the leadership of field operations, but not limited to:

-    Medical support for terrorist fighters inside Israel.

-    Direct intervention and coordination with terrorist groups: especially in Daraa - Quneitra - Golan.

-    Field intervention in battles (Israeli officers were responsible for terrorist camps). Some of them were eliminated during Syrian airstrikes against those camps.

     To sum, the goal of the Israeli intervention in the global war in Syria was to try to limit the role and influence of the resistance axis. If this intervention had been successful, it would have had very important strategic opportunities and geopolitical repercussions for Israel. Since could achieve the following: 

1. Disrupt Syria's development of its military and technological capabilities: which are based on confronting Israel and finding a strategic balance with it.

2. Divide and fragment Syria: involving the state and the army in internal political and military confrontations to weaken and fragment them.

3. Destruction of Syrian unconventional weapons: the withdrawal of Syrian chemical weapons during the war in 2014, in accordance with United Nations Resolution 2118.

4. Limit arms transfers to Lebanese Hezbollah: This is achieved by attacking supply lines and transferring weapons from Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon without entering into a comprehensive war with them.

5. Limit Iranian influence: This is achieved by destabilizing Syria and increasing the intensity of the sectarian and nationalist confrontation between Shiite Persian Iran and Sunni Arab countries.  

      Although Israel was able to gain benefits from the global war against Syria, with all that, there are also serious geopolitical changes and future threats as a result of the strategic victory of the resistance axis in that war in cooperation with Russia. The nature of the challenges it faces has become very different, requiring creating radical modifications to the structure and concept of Israeli national security. The most important of these threats and changes are: 

-    The resistance axis now has offensive military capabilities that can reach Israeli depth.

-    The Syrian army and Hezbollah now have tremendous military experience as a result of the guerrilla war with terrorist movements.

-   The Axis of Resistance will develop its military strategy based on attacking Israel's air and maritime superiority in any future confrontation. 

     In light of the above, and as a result of the victories achieved by the Syrian army and the resistance movements, it must be recognized that the new political and military realities resulting from the global war against Syria confirm the existence of a clearly defined strategic vision by the resistance axis to confront the Israeli plans.

         Therefore, the attack by the Palestinian movement Hamas on October 6, 2023 and the direct Iranian military attack on Israel (in April 2024) through hundreds of marches and missiles as a reaction and self-defense after its consulate in Damascus being subjected to Israeli bombing, can be considered just a simple example that reflects the extent of radical military geopolitical changes in the balance of power, which will be just a point in the ocean of a future comprehensive confrontation on all fronts between Israel and the axis of resistance.


       [1] The resistance axis: is a political term used primarily in the Middle East and means the implicit strategic alliance (political and military) that primarily opposes the Israeli occupation of Palestine. This axis includes: Iran, Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine, as well as the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, also the Houthi Ansar Allah movement in Yemen.


2023-12-02

O you who pass between the fleeting words


 

O you who pass between the fleeting words, take your names and leave, withdraw your hours from our time and leave, and steal whatever pictures you want so that you know that you will not know how a stone from our earth builds the roof of the sky.

2023-02-19

Iranian Strategic Patience: Israel and the Soft Wars

 


Dr. Salam Al Rabadi

Unfortunately, by tracking the pattern of strategies of many countries based on exaggerated interest in human rights, women's and democracy issues in Iran (such as the case of the death of the Iranian girl Mahsa Amini), it is no longer possible to ignore the extent of the political, security and cultural exploitation that is taking place. This pattern was adopted previously in Syria, which led to its entry into the quagmire of war since 2011. Therefore, based on the presence of Iran in the same political direction, the same pattern was followed, as the issue is linked primarily to confronting Iran's rising power.

In principle, there is a strategy that has become clear and known,  it is based on cultural backgrounds whose main goal is to fragment societies from within (soft wars). As many countries (Israel in particular) cannot accept at all the reality of Iran's presence as a major regional power. Where, despite all the sanctions policies pursued to isolate and marginalize Iran during the past 45 years, Iran was able to build its own strength and consolidate its regional influence.

Consequently, those countries that are hostile to Iran have no choice but to move towards exploiting some controversial issues within Iranian society related to human rights, women and democracy, in order to destabilize and weaken it. Accordingly, these countries moved towards the option of soft war through:

  • Cultural penetration within Iranian society to tear apart its political structure.
  •  Supporting terrorist movements, including trying to reproduce a new ISIS.

In this context, there is a lot of evidence confirming these external interventions aimed at plunging Iran into internal conflicts and wars, including but not limited to:

  1. Seizing arms shipments coming from abroad, which coincided with the internal riots.
  2. Dismantling terrorist cells that were planning to assassinate figures of Arab origin and carry out terrorist operations in religious places in order to ignite a civil war.
  3. Arresting terrorist groups linked to foreign intelligence working to smuggle weapons.

Based on these facts, it seems that the main goal is to destroy the societal structure, exaggerate political polarization, and undermine security stability. So that Iran becomes more fragile and subject to division. Practically, the Iranian Republic is facing a hybrid war, whose political goal is based on confronting Iranian influence, where this influence is  based on:

-          Sticking to the nuclear program.

-          Supporting the resistance movements in their confrontation with the Israeli occupation of Palestine.

-          Being present in Syria and assisting the Syrian army in its war against terrorist movements.

-          Supporting the Houthis in Yemen permanently.

-          Consolidate influence in Iraq at all levels.

-          Strategic rapprochement with both Russia and China.

Here, it must be recognized that the internal Iranian tensions are a winning card that the United States and Israel have tried to exploit to incite the Iranian people against the regime and clash with it. This new situation or challenge required the Iranian government to adopt a different vision on how to deal with such developments. Where the Iranian government and its security institutions followed a policy of restraint and not taking any provocative step that might lead to a clash. On the contrary, work has been done to:

1-       Absorbing the anger of the people and allowing demonstrations.

2-       Closely monitoring the security situation and controlling terrorist cells.

3-       Revealing to Iranian society the dirty policies of mobilization and media incitement.

4-       Evidence that many opposition movements are linked to the agenda of foreign countries.

5-       Linking the internal events with the pattern based on the implementation of the Syrian model in Iran.

In this context, and regardless of the extent of the Iranian government's ability to confront these soft wars, there are very serious political, cultural and internal security challenges that can no longer be ignored, and they require a reconsideration of many policies that were thought to have become axiomatic, including:

-          It is no longer possible to pursue a policy that is based on holding Iranian governments accountable and neutralizing the Supreme Leader of the Revolution or the institution of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist(Guardianship of the Faqih), from any responsibility.

-          The existence of radical changes linked to security threats, which are no longer confined to the Israeli threat, but have extended to include terrorist movements.

-          Increasing the complexities associated with foreign plans that seek to undermine the foundations of the Iranian state.

-          Internal crises appear to be the most dangerous, and may lead to making strategic concessions at the level of the nuclear file, the Palestinian cause, and the relationship with Syria and the resistance movements.

In sum, the exaggerated interest in human rights issues comes in the context of the pressures that Iran has been exposed to for decades, to achieve geopolitical goals. However, according to how Iran faced the previous challenges, it seems that it is able to overcome the current difficulties, as the pillars of the state are still solid at all levels.

Furthermore, Iran's ability to reassess its foreign relations should not be underestimated, based on the equation that Iran's security is linked to the security of the region. Iran has many options that enhance this equation. There are multidimensional entitlements linked to the Iranian reality, whether in terms of the nuclear program or an increase in the intensity of the collision with Israel or energy security. For example, it is no longer possible to always rely on Iran's continued restraint in Yemen, the resulting regional and global strategic repercussions, at least on the level of global energy security balances.

Not to mention that if Iran's strategic patience runs out, it is not at all unlikely that Iran will directly target Israeli interests. Perhaps at some point the confrontation may be direct within occupied Palestine itself. As Iran is fully aware that all attempts to destabilize it cannot be separated at all from the reactions of Israel, which faces an existential danger after losing all its wars with the axis of resistance that is fully and unlimitedly supported by the Iranian Republic.





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